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ABSTRACT
This thesis provides a desktop guide to assist the program manager in the use of
multiyear procurement. Information is provided to help the program manager in
selecting multiyear candidates and guidance is provided to assist the program
manager in the implementation of multiyear procurement. A questionnaire was
used to elicit information from multiyear procurement users about problematic
issues they have encountered. It is difficult to develop a system that meets the
disparate needs of the contractor, Department of Defense, and Congress. The end
result has been the development of a system based on compromise and
accommodation. The responses to the questionnaires indicated, while there are
aspects of multiyear procurement that some program offices would, at times, like
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A. AREA OF RESEARCH
Multiyear procurement is a method of contracting which covers more than one year's,
but not in excess of five year's requirements. A multiyear contract is an alternative to a
series of annual contracts in which the end items are procured one year at a time. It can
benefit the government by saving money and improving contractor productivity. Possible
risks exist which are covered by a cancellation ceiling. Also, certain criteria must be met
and adherence to general procedures is required to effectively process a multiyear
contract. This thesis addresses the disadvantages and advantages of multiyear contracting.
It also focuses on the concepts and general procedures required for the effective
implementation of a multiyear contract. Problematic issues encountered by personnel
involved in multiyear procurements, and the actions they took to overcome them are
outlined in this thesis.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question is—what are the required procedures for the
preparation and approval of a multiyear procurement?
Subsidiary questions include:
I. What are the funding requirements for multiyear procurement?
II. What documentation is required to support a decision to use a multiyear contract?
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III. What are current issues procurement personnel confront while working with
multiyear procurements?
C. DISCUSSION
The action to put together a guide on the use of multiyear contracting arose out of the
Navy Research, Development and Acquisition Team Strategic Plan. There were seven
groups created to implement or bring to closure ideas flowing from the RDA Strategic
Planning Sessions, the first Navy-CEO Conference, and the Management Action Plan.
The seven groups mirror the organization of the Strategic Plan - Workforce, Business
Practices, Total Cost of Ownership, Organizational Management, Innovation/Technology,
Customer/Stakeholder Credibility, and Communications. Members of these teams are
cross-functional and cross Navy organizational.
The original action on multiyear contracting came from the Management Action Plan.
It was worded: "Identify the Barriers to using multiyear contracting in order to maximize
its use." A second action came from a strategic planning offsite, and was listed as "Long
term and multiyear contracts." A working subgroup developed a recommendation which
contained the statutory and regulatory language on multiyear contracting, and concluded
that a guide be developed to assist managers in the use of multiyear contracts. The intent
of this handbook is to place multiyear procurement background, concepts, and guidance
for the use of multiyear procurement at the fingertips ofthe program managers.
D. SCOPE OF THESIS
The core of this thesis is the handbook for program managers. This handbook explains
what multiyear procurement actually consists of and detail the procedures necessary for
multiyear procurement approval. Examples of documentation that are required for
multiyear procurement approval are included. While this thesis discusses the requirement
to demonstrate substantial multiyear procurement cost savings, it does not develop a
comprehensive multiyear cost model. To further assist the program manager in making
the decision to use multiyear procurement, a section on major issues in multiyear
procurement is incorporated.
E. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used by the researcher consists of two basic procedures: (1 ) review
of pertinent literature, (2) the use of telephone interviews, and (3) questionnaires. The
comprehensive review of relevant outstanding literature on multiyear procurement
consisted of obtaining reports and information from the following sources:
• Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange




The literature search was performed to provide the researcher with a broad
background and understanding of multiytar procurement. The telephone interviews were
conducted primarily to establish firm points of contact for the questionnaires. Qualitative
data was accumulated based on questionnaires completed by key personnel associated
with multiyear procurement. Questionnaires were completed by acquisition managers,
program managers, contract specialists, financial managers, and government contractors.
The questionnaires were disseminated and responded to through the use of e-mail.
F. CHAPTER OUTLINE
I. Introduction - Research questions, methods, and scope.
II. Background - Understanding multiyear procurement.
III. The multiyear procurement process.
IV. Issues in multiyear procurement today.
Appendices:
• Definitions
• Examples of support documentation
• Multiyear Procurement flow chart
• Multiyear Procurement timing process
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
Although multiyear procurement is a viable procurement strategy, it is not being fully
utilized within the Department of the Navy. The results of this research make valuable
information regarding multiyear procurement readily available to the program office. With
a better understanding of multiyear procurement concepts and procedures, Program
Managers will be more likely to consider multiyear contracting as a possible acquisition
strategy. In our current environment of shrinking budgets and personal resources within
the United States Government, optimization of multiyear procurement is vital to the
success of efficient and economical contracting.

H. BACKGROUND - UNDERSTANDING MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT
A. BACKGROUND
The history of multiyear procurement dates back to the 1960's. During the late 1960's
DoD had little trouble using multiyear procurement for acquisition. There was little
reason to challenge the cancellation record of government agencies, since few contracts
were actually canceled. Evidence to that effect was produced by a 1965 Logistics
Management Institute study that reviewed all (42) multiyear contracts issued prior to 1965
and found that none had been canceled. The study also asserted that these multiyear
contracts accounted for administrative savings in excess of $1 .25 million.
Beginning with the early 1970's, multiyear procurement faced a dramatic slowdown.
In 1972, the Navy presented Congress with two cancellation charges totaling over $388
million resulting from problems with shipbuilding contracts that happened to be multiyear.
Because this cancellation charge had not been funded, Congress was forced to enact
special legislation to provide payment owed the contractor. In response to this, Congress
established a $5 million cancellation ceiling, which became law as part of the FY 1 973
Armed Forces Authorization Act. This action was the legislators' way of maintaining
control over multiyear contracting for weapon systems, and it effectively eliminated major
acquisitions from multiyear procurement. [Ref. 29: p. 46]
In 1981, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Frank Carlucci, proposed a package of
initiatives to improve defense weapon system acquisition, including greater use of
multiyear procurement to reduce cost and enhance program stability. As a direct result of
Mr. Carlucci's Acquisition Improvement Program (ATP) initiatives, Section 909 of the
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-86) was born.
With the signing of the 1982 Defense Authorization Act multiyear contracting again
became a possible procurement strategy.
The Congress finds that in order to ensure national defense preparedness, to
conserve fiscal resources, and to enhance defense production capability, it is in the
interest of the United States to acquire property and services for the Department
of Defense in the most timely, economic and efficient manner. It is therefore the
policy of the Congress that services and property (including weapon systems and
associated items) for the Department of Defense be acquired by any kind of
contract, other than cost-plus-percentage-of-cost contracts, but including
multiyear contracts, that will promote the interests ofthe United States. Further, it
is the policy of the Congress that such contracts, when practicable, provide for the
purchase of property at items and in quantities that will result in reduced costs to
the Government and provide incentives to contractors to improve productivity
through investment in capital facilities, equipment, and advanced technology. It is
also the policy of the Congress that contacts for advanced procurement of
components, parts and materials necessary for manufacture of for logistics support
of a weapon system should, if feasible and practicable, be entered into in a manner
to achieve economic-lot purchases and more efficient production rates. [Ref. 1]
The Defense Authorization Act of 1982 authorized the following changes:
1
.
Raised the cancellation ceiling to $ 1 00 million;
2. Required the notification of Congress thirty days in advance of entering into a
multiyear contract with a cancellation ceiling in excess of $100 million;
3. Allows inclusion of recurring and nonrecurring costs in the cancellation
provisions;
4. Allows the use of any kind of contract, except cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost;
5. Provides a clear authorization for the advance procurement of components,
parts and materials in order to achieve economic quantity lot purchases and
more efficient production rates;
6. Provides a maximum term of five program years for multiyear contracts;
7. Identifies possible cancellation funding sources as:
a. appropriations originally available for the performance of the contract
concerned;
b. appropriations currently available for procurement of the type of
property concerned, and not otherwise obligated; or
c. funds appropriated for those payments. [Ref. 30: p. 7]
In 1983, the Presidential Private Sector Survey by the Grace Commission advocated
greater use of multiyear procurement and stated that DoD might save as much as $3
billion over the next several years with more aggressive use of multiyear procurement.
[Ref. 31: p. 12]
Throughout the 1980's Congress increasingly emphasized multiyear procurement
savings requirements.
• FY 1983 House Appropriations Committee Report - No specified savings
requirement, but DoD justification must identify savings at a discounted rate.
• FY 1984 Appropriations Conference Report - No multiyear contract should be
awarded if savings compared to annual contracts at the time of contract award are
less than those estimated in the budget submission.
• FY 1986 Authorization Act - Authority to enter a multiyear contract is denied if it
costs more than 90% of estimated annual contract costs.
• FY 1987 Authorization Act - Authority to enter a multiyear contract is denied if it
costs more than 88% of estimated annual contract costs.
• FY 1989 Authorization Act - Multiyear contract must achieve 10% savings over
the current negotiated contract, adjusted for changes in inflation and quantity of
weapons to be purchased; or, 12% over the costs of annual contracts if no recent
contract experience exists. [Ref. 32: p. 16]
With increased congressional requirements on multiyear procurement programs, there
was growing concern in DoD that multiyear procurement was no longer a viable
acquisition strategy. Therefore, in 1990, DoD proposed that the 10% savings threshold be
replaced by a requirement that multiyear candidates demonstrate substantial savings of the
total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts. This
proposal was accepted and included inn the FY 91 National Defense Authorization Act.
[Ref. 32: p. 17]
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Table 1 displays the savings and percentage savings for the current/proposed DoD
multiyear procurement initiatives.
Program Savings (in millions) % Savings Period ofMYP
120mm Tank Round, all types 137.0 11.0 94-98
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) 30.3 11.0 96-98
MlA2 Tank Upgrade 236.0 13.5 96-00
Longbow Apache Airframe 131.8 7.6 96-00
Javelin (AAWS-M) 102.4 11.6 97-00
Army Tactical Missile System 35.1 9.0 97-01
DDG-51 Destroyer 788.0 6.4 98-01
C-17 Aircraft:
Airframe 834.8 5.5 97-03
Engine 175.6 8.7 97-03
Longbow Apache Fire Control Radar 79.4 13.5 98-03
Longbow Hellfire Missile 133.8 8.9 99-03
Table 1. Savings for the current/proposed DoD multiyear procurement initiatives
B. DESCRD7TION OF MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT
Multiyear Procurement is a method of contracting which covers more than one year's
but not in excess of five year's requirements. A multiyear contract is an alternative to a
series of annual contracts in which the end items are procured one year at a time. Total
contract quantities and annual quantities are planned for a particular level and type of
funding as displayed in a current five year development plan. Each program year is
11
annually budgeted and funded and, at the time of award, funds need only to have been
appropriated for the first year. The contractor is protected against loss resulting from
cancellation by contract provisions which allow reimbursement of costs included in the
cancellation ceiling. [Ref. 2: p. 17.102-3]




A multiyear contract for the purchase of a weapon system, items and services
associated with a weapon system, and logistics support for a weapon system
2. A multiyear contract for advance procurement of components, parts, and materials
necessary to the manufacture of a weapon system, including a multiyear contract for such
advance procurement that is entered into in order to achieve economic-lot purchases and
more efficient production rates. [Ref. 14: 2306b(h)]
Approval authority for a major weapon system program to engage in a multiyear
procurement strategy rests with Congress. Potential candidates are usually identified
during the services' Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process. A detailed
justification package supporting the applicability of each candidate is prepared and
submitted with the POM. After review and acceptance by the Service Command and
DoD, the package becomes part of the President's Budget submission to Congress.
Congressional approval in an authorization Act signifies a program's eligibility for
multiyear procurement. Prior to contract award, the proposed multiyear savings upon
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which Congress based its eligibility decision must be validated by actual contractor
proposals. [Ref. 3: p.3]
There are two basic types of multiyear procurement:
Classic multiyear procurement - With classic multiyear procurement, the entire contract
amount would be proposed in the President's Budget. Funds for the first year's
requirements would be requested in the next fiscal years budget. The funds for subsequent
years production would be requested in the corresponding fiscal years. Congress is not
required to appropriate the funds for the subsequent years, but they would have to pay a
significant cancellation charge if they do not.
Expanded multiyear procurement - The use of expanded multiyear procurement allows for
expanded advance buys. An expanded advance buy is the acquisition of out-year materials
in economic order quantities to obtain lot buys at a lower price. Economies of scale are
achieved by combining the production requirements for the entire contract. The
contractor can place an order for the quantities required for all items to be produced in the
contract, instead of ordering annual requirements several times. This also allows the
contractor to make longer production runs further increasing efficiency. The cancellation
ceiling for expanded multiyear procurement is larger. The ceiling includes the expanded
advance buy along with the other charges associated with the classic multiyear
procurement.
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C. ADVANTAGES OF MULTTYEAR PROCUREMENT
There are eight objectives of multiyear curement listed in FAR Part 17.102-3
which can be viewed as beneficial. Use of ultiyear contracting is encouraged to take
advantage of one or more of these objectives:
1
.
Lower costs: By funding economic lot buys, multiyear procurement frees
manufacturers from having to make smaller, more costly piecemeal buys and thus
promises to reduce the cost of mature, low-risk programs. The GAO found that 75% of
savings on one major weapon system was due to economies in vendor procurement. [Ref.
4: p. a-6]
2. Enhancement of standardization. Costs are saved by a greater degree of
standardization of parts and manufacturing routines. A large portion of the cost of
manufacturing results from having to create and set up unique production stands and jigs.
Multiyear's greater time should make it possible to consider using either existing
manufacturing routines and tools or integrating items into current ones. Instead of
creating new routines, longer planning times should allow greater flexibility. This in turn
should promote greater standardization to cut costs and spread overhead expenses. One
study conducted in 1994 found that 93% of those surveyed agreed that multiyear




Reduction of administrative burden in the placement and administration of
contracts: Costs are saved by the processing one multiyear contract instead of several
14
annual contracts. Fewer statement ofworks are prepared, proposals analyzed, and
contracts prepared and negotiated. This not only saves costs but frees up resources
during a time of government downsizing.
4. Substantial continuity of production or performance, thus avoiding annual startup
costs, pre-production testing costs, make-ready expenses, and phaseout costs: Multiyear
Procurement increases the predictability ofdemand over the life of the contract, allowing
the contractor to organize the production more efficiently. More efficient production
allows the contractor to offer the government a lower price.
5. Stabilization of contractor work forces: The reduced costs associated with
learning curves are further enhanced by retaining a highly skilled work force over a longer
period. The GAO found increased worker familiarity with productive tasks and greater
efficiency in its analysis of the Army's Multiple Launch Rocket System multiyear contract.
[Ref. 5: p. 9]
6. Avoidance of the need for establishing and "proving out" quality control
techniques and procedures for a new contractor each year: The government will have to
"prove out" the contractors quality control techniques and procedures only once at the
beginning of the multiyear contract. Once the contractor is certified to the level of
inspection required the government needs to take a much less detailed look in the
subsequent years. A succession of annual contracts could potentially entail a detailed
"proving out" be performed each year with a new contractor.
7. Broadening the competitive base with opportunity for participation by firms not
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otherwise willing or able to compete for lesser quantities, particularly in cases involving
high startup costs: Provide incentives to contractors to improve productivity through
investment in capital facilities, equipment, and advanced technology: Multiyear
procurement guarantees a contractor greater coverage for risks in making investments in
capital equipment than an annual procurement because they can go to creditors with a
signed contract covering several years instead of one. [Ref. 6: p. 1 1 88]
8. Provide incentives to contractors to improve productivity through investment in
capital facilities, equipment, and advanced technology.
Contractors are further encouraged to modernize their plants because they can
amortize investment costs over a two to five year period instead of a single year. The
General Accounting Office found that 81% of contractors surveyed reported a multiyear
contract influenced their decisions to make a capital investment. [Ref. 17: p. 2]
A representative of a major military manufacturer made the following comment on
multiyear's real value:
Multiyear contracting encourages capital investment far beyond what annual
contracting does. Capital investment is the single greatest influence on
productivity. All U.S. industries are working to increase their competitiveness in
world markets as free trade expands. Higher productivity in Defense is critically
important. Yet the real emphasis is absent as evidenced by the reduced use of
multiyear contracting over the past few years. [Ref. 16: p. 126]
The benefits and advantages of multiyear prime contracts may frequently be increased
by multiyear subcontracts under the prime contracts. While prime contractors should be
encouraged to employ multiyear subcontracts, the choice of the appropriate subcontract
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types remains with the prime contractor who should employ multiyear subcontracts only
when in its judgment:
1
.
The subcontract item or service is of stable design and specification;
2. The quantity required is reasonably firm and continuing;
3. Effective competition may be enhanced; and
4. Multiyear subcontracts can reasonably be expected to result in reduced prices.
Multiyear subcontracts may be particularly desirable under a multiyear prime contract
awarded without full and open competition, since effective competition at the subcontract
level may be enhanced and the attendant cost reductions realized by the prime contractor
and the government. [Ref. 2: p. 17.104-2]
D. DISADVANTAGES OF MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT
Although multiyear procurement can benefit the government by saving money and
improving contractor productivity, it can also entail certain risks, such as increased costs
to the government, should a multiyear contract be changed or terminated. A particular
disadvantage of multiyear contracts is that they decrease annual budget flexibility because
the Congress and DoD commit themselves to fund such contracts through completion or
pay any contract cancellation charges, which may be substantial. If DoD's procurement
budget is reduced significantly and multiyear contracts are maintained, programs not under
multiyear contracts would have to be cut disproportionately. Multiyear contracts may
"lock-in" the Department of Defense to future expenditures, but as one Air Force General
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stated: "It does lock you in, but that's the whole idea behind multiyear procurement. You
get stability in a program, and you only select candidates you're convinced you want to
pursue on a long-term basis." [Ref. 7: p. 117]
Multiyear procurement requires a large up front (TOA) total obligation authority for
the first year. The services must fully fund the annual requirements of the multiyear
contract. This large up front funding may limit the implementation of multiyear
procurement by squeezing out other competing systems the DoD desires.
Perhaps the biggest disadvantage of multiyear procurement is the termination liability
the Government faces if it cancels a multiyear contract early in its life. For example, on an
aircraft multiyear contract there is a cancellation ceiling negotiated above the actual value
of the aircraft for the first year covering the contractor's purchases of materials and
subsystems for future years' aircraft. Scheduling these expenses forward is one reason
multiyear contracts save money, but in exchange the Government takes on a liability it
must pay in the event of contract cancellation. [Ref. 8: p. 7]
E. CRITERIA FOR USE OF MULTIYEAR CONTRACTING
Multiyear contracting may be used when one or more of the objectives in FAR Part
17.102-3 can be met, and the following criteria are present:
1 . The use of such a contract will result in reduced total costs under the contract.
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2. The minimum need for the item to be purchased is expected to remain substantially
unchanged during the contemplated contract period in terms of production rate,
acquisition rate, and total quantities.
3. There is a reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period
the department or agency will request funding for the contract at the level required
to avoid contract cancellation.
4. There is a stable design for the item to be acquired and the technical risks
associated with such items are not excessive.
5. The estimates of both the cost ofthe contract and the anticipated cost avoidance
through the use of a multiyear contract are realistic. [Ref. 2: p. 17.102-3]
Criterion 1 must describe the benefit of multiyear procurement over annual buy
procurement. The FY91 National Defense Authorization Act states that multiyear
candidates demonstrate "substantial savings of the total anticipated costs of carrying out
the program through annual contracts." Criteria 2 through 5 must convince approval
authorities the program is sufficiently stable and understood to warrant multiyear
procurement use.
The complexity of the system will largely determine the year in which multiyear
procurement should begin. For systems well within the current state of technology, the
first production run might be the right starting point, provided there were no major
problems during full-scale development. Systems on the cutting edge of technology are
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generally not appropriate for the multiyear approach until the system's design has
stabilized, usually after two or three production runs. [Ref. 10: p. 26]
The GAO made the following comment regarding the Javelin anti-armor
weapon system's design stability:
Javelin's design has been in transition since it was operationally tested in 1993.
Each production of Javelin through the first year of full-rate production will
produce a different configuration of the system. The Army has not completed
technical and operational tests of Javelin with all design changes incorporated. In
addition, early tests have shown that some changes require additional redesign. By
delaying the multiyear contract until the Army has successfully tested Javelin's
design and the design's stability is demonstrated by production, the government
can reduce the risk that additional redesign will reduce or eliminate multiyear cost
savings. [Ref. 1 1 : p. 19]
Annual DoD Authorization and Appropriations Acts and 10 U.S.C. 2306(h) have
established the following additional criteria:
1
.
The use of such a contract will promote the national security ofthe United States.
2. The contract provides for a production rate at not less than minimum economic
production rates given the existing tooling and facilities
F. CONTRACT PRICING TECHNIQUES
Because of the long-term impact on prices of multiyear contracts, two pricing
techniques are often used:
1. Level Unit Pricing
Level unit pricing is the preferred method for arriving at a per unit cost since it forces
contractors to assume the risk of price fluctuations in the out years of the contract.
Conceptually, level unit pricing results in all contract costs, including the amounts
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projected for inflation, being amortized over the life of a contract resulting in the same unit
price appearing for all years of the contract. This has a tendency to either over or under
inflate actual costs since contractor costs are based on estimates. The longer the contract
runs the more pronounced the effect until a price projected five years into the future may
have little relationship to actual costs incurred. Variable unit pricing may be used but only
if the head of the contracting activity or a designee, feels there is a valid method for
evaluation of offers. [Ref. 26: p. 19]
2. Economic Price Adjustment
The contracting officer is encouraged to use an economic price adjustment clause when
the labor and material costs are likely to fluctuate during the period of performance. A
multiyear contract with economic price adjustment provides for upward and downward
revision of the stated contract price upon the occurrence of specified contingencies.
Economic price adjustments are of three general types:
1. Adjustments based on established prices. These price adjustments are based on
increases or decreases from an agreed-upon level in published or otherwise
established prices of specific items or the contract end items.
2. Adjustments based on actual costs of labor or material. These price adjustments
are based on increases or decreases in specified costs of labor or material that the
contractor actually experiences during contract performance.
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3. Adjustments based on cost indexes of labor or material. These price adjustments
are based on increases or decreases in labor or material cost standards or indexes
that are specifically identified in the contract. [Ref. 2: p. 1 6.203-1]
G. CANCELLATION OF MULTIYEAR CONTRACTS
Although the government commits itself to a contract extending beyond the current
fiscal year, the funding is still appropriated by congress annually. Congress has reserved
themselves the right to "cancel" the contract if they decide not to appropriate funds for
subsequent years. Cancellation results when the contracting officer (a) notifies the
contractor of nonavailability of funds for contract performance for any subsequent
program year, or (b) fails to notify the contractor that funds are available for performance
of the succeeding program year requirement. [Ref. 2: p. 17.101]
All program years except the first are subject to cancellation. The contracting officer
must establish a cancellation ceiling for each program year subject to cancellation.
Congressional legislation in the DoD Authorization Act of 1982 set the maximum
cancellation ceiling at $100 million Congress must receive a thirty days notice for
multiyear contracts with ceilings above $100 million. The cancellation charge need not be
funded before contract award.
The amount which is actually paid to the contractor upon settlement for unrecovered
costs (which can only be equal to or less than the ceiling) is referred to as the cancellation
charge. The cancellation charge is intended to cover:
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• costs reasonably necessary for production which would have been equitably
amortized in the unit prices for the entire multiyear contract period, but which,
because of the cancellation, are not amortized;
• all unpaid labor, material and other costs incurred by the contractor or its
subcontractors for production of the canceled items required by the expanded
advanced buy;
• cost impact on non-canceled items (i.e., subcontract price increases resulting
from quantity reduction); and
• a reasonable profit on such incurred costs. [Ref. 28: p. 30]
The cancellation ceiling is composed of nonrecurring and recurring costs.
Nonrecurring costs are those production costs which are generally incurred on a one time
basis and include such costs as capital investment, plant or equipment relocation, plant
rearrangement, special tooling and special test equipment, preproduction engineering,
initial spoilage and rework, and specialized work force training. They shall not include
any costs of labor or materials, or other expenses, which might be incurred for
performance of subsequent program year requirements. The total estimate of the above
costs must then be compared with the best estimate of the contract cost to arrive at a
reasonable percentage or dollar figure. This cancellation ceiling will be reduced each
program year in direct proportion to the remaining requirements subject to cancellation.
For example, consider that the total nonrecurring costs are estimated at ten percent of the
23




30% in the first year,
2. 30% in the second,
3. 20% in the third,
4. 10% in the fourth, and
5. 10% in the fifth.
The cancellation percentages, after deducting three percent for the first program year,
would be seven, four, two, and one percent of the total price applicable to the second,
third, fourth, and fifth program years, respectively. [Ref. 2: p. 17.103-1]
While multiyear contracts cancellation ceilings generally cover nonrecurring costs they
can also give permission for the contractor to recoup some recurring costs in the event of
contract cancellation. Recurring costs are defined as production costs which vary with the
quantity of items produced, such as labor and materials. Examples of recurring costs
include advance orders for long lead-time parts and Economic Order Quantities of
materials. [Ref. 12] If the contract is canceled, the advance EOQ outyear components
will probably already have been purchased or made for the end items being canceled.
The services view full funding cancellation ceilings as a disincentive to use multiyear
contracting. Military and OSD officials responsible for the day to day management of
weapons acquisition, feels that the criteria for approving multiyear contracts are stringent
enough so as to permit only contracts with a very slim chance of cancellation to go
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through. Thus, they believe the additional funding needed for the EOQ items added to
any multiyear contract for cancellation is unnecessary. The service procurement officers
fear the funding needed for multiyear cancellation ceilings, especially in the first year, may
crowd other important weapon programs out of their budget. [Ref. 8: p. 24]
H. MULTIYEAR FUNDING
Contract funding is the process of committing, or reserving, available funds for a
specific purpose. It authorizes the incurrence of an obligation. For multiyear contracts,
DoD does not fully fund the entire program requirements being purchased. Instead,
multiyear requirements are funded one year at a time with annual appropriations. At the
time the contract is awarded, funds are appropriated for the first year only. When funds
are appropriated in the subsequent years, they are obligated when the contracting officer
executes a contract modification for the given program year's requirements. The
contractor is not required to proceed until funds are appropriated and the contractor has
been informed that the funds are available.
The funding of multiyear contracts has two components: the end items being procured
and the cancellation ceiling. (1) The amount required to fully fund the end item
requirements in a given fiscal year is the total end item cost less any portion of the end
item cost previously obligated for advance procurement. (2) The cancellation ceiling
consists of the estimated termination liability created by the advance (EOQ) economic
order quantity procurement, (i.e., the recurring costs) and the nonrecurring costs.
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DoD Appropriations Acts have directed that the EOQ advance procurement must be
funded to at least the limits of the Government's liability. This means the recurring
portion of the cancellation ceiling must be funded. DoD Directive (DoDD) 7200.4, Full
Funding of DoD Procurement Programs, also requires the budget to cover at least the
termination liability of the EOQ multiyear contract since it is DoD's policy not to create
unfunded contract liabilities for EOQ procurements associated with multiyear contracts.
Two exceptions to this policy are: (1) if it would be more effective to fully fund (see full
funding in the glossary) the advance EOQ procurements, or (2) if approval from Congress
and/or the Assistant Secretary of Defense Comptroller (ASD(C)) is granted to include the
costs in an unfunded cancellation ceiling. When portions of the cancellation ceiling are not
funded, an unfunded contingent liability is created. If the unfunded contingent liability
exceeds $20 million, Congress must receive a thirty day notification prior to contract
award. The nonrecurring portion of the total cancellation ceiling is not attributable to
EOQ requirements. Flexibility lies with the decision maker in whether or not to fund the
nonrecurring portion of the cancellation ceiling; however, the program manager should
refer to the current funding policy of their particular service, for any changes in this area.
[Ref. 18:43-11]
I. METHOD OF CONTRACTING
1. Contract Type
Multiyear contracting is compatible with sealed bidding, including two-step sealed
bidding, and negotiated procurement, so the nature of the requirement should govern the
26
selection of the method of contracting. [Ref. 2: p. 17.103-1] Resulting contracts may
only be firm-fixed price, fixed-price with economic price adjustment, or fixed-price
incentive.
Given the longer performance period associated with multiyear acquisition,
consideration in pricing contracts should be given to the use of economic price adjustment
terms, profit objectives comparable with risk (i.e., greater profit for greater risk), and
financing arrangements which reflect contractor cash flow requirements (i.e. progress
payments.) [Ref. 2: p. 17.102-3]
2. Special Clauses
While contract types are used to allocate risk, special clauses can address more specific




Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) clauses establish the index used to adjust input
prices for determining the cost base of the contract. The more inflationary the times, the
more important these clauses become.
2. Termination clauses allow the contractor to recover incurred production costs for the
current contract year. The government can initiate termination for cause at any time
during a contract. Termination clauses are found in all contracts. Do not terminate a
multiyear contract under a program approved by Congress without providing a ten-day
advance notification to the Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. [Ref. 13: p. 217.103-1]
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3. Cancellation clauses allow the contractor to recover out-year production costs that
have been incurred in the current year. They are found only in multiyear procurement
contracts and usually cover the unrecovered cost of the economic order quantity (EOQ).
They only apply in the event that Congress does not appropriate funds for the out-years of
a program and can only be initiated at the beginning of a contract year. If a multiyear
procurement contract is canceled, then the termination clause covers the incurred cost for
current year production and the cancellation clause covers the incurred cost for out-year
production. Together they should cover the contractor's total incurred production costs.
4. Indemnification clauses allow the contractor to recover capital, facilities, and idle
capacity (nonproduction) costs when triggered by specific events, such as termination or
cancellation. In a multiyear contract, a capitalization schedule for payment is negotiated in
advance that determines how much the government must pay the contractor in case
indemnification is triggered. This coverage encourages the contractor to invest in cost-
reducing capital and facilities improvements, the costs of which cannot be recovered under
a single year of production. If a contract is ended and the government pays the
indemnification fees, the contractor turns over the property indemnified to the
government. Precontractual negotiations determine what capital investments are included.
The contractor chooses which items it would sell and include in the clause and which
items it would keep and not include in the clause. This type of coverage is separate from
any monetary incentives the government offers for technical or production improvements.
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5. Engineering change proposals (ECPs) allow the government to change the technical
specifications of the weapon system as appropriate. ECP clauses contain language that
allows for the renegotiation of the contract cost base in this event. It protects the
contractor from cost growth imposed because of government actions to improve the
system.
6. Warranties define who bears the risk of poor performance or operational The more
uncertain the technical performance at the time of the contract, the more limited the
warranty will be, so that the government bears the risk ofnonperformance and the costs of
improving performance through ECP clauses. Standard warranty clauses cover material
and workmanship, design conformance, and minimal performance standards. Contractors
limit their liability by specified dollar ceilings on their warranties, delayed specification of
the performance measures, reduced time coverage, or refusing to warrant specific
technical performances. [Ref. 1 5 : p. 3 1 ]
7. Notification clauses require the prime contractor to notify the government prior to
making changes in his plans to buy advance materials.
8. Variations in Quantity. In some cases the contractor may be able to accommodate
small changes in the multiyear quantity, either on a year-to-year basis or on the total
quantity. This would provide the Government some relief in case their requirements were
to increase or decrease in the outyears. The allowable variations in quantity will be
determined at the time of contract negotiation.
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9. Contractor Cost Performance Reporting. Due to the unique requirements of multiyear
procurement (i.e., level unit pricing), special tailoring of cost reports will probably be
necessary. An earned value management clause tailored to meet the unique requirements
of multiyear procurement can be included in the contract. For some types of cost data it
may be sufficient to have the contractor maintain the data and have it available for
government review upon request. Cost data are useful in evaluating future contractor
proposals, or in evaluating changes, should they occur. [Ref. 27: p. 59]
10. Limitation of Price and Contractor Obligations clause states how the multiyear
contract will be funded and priced. It says the amount of funds available at award is
sufficient to cover production of only the first year quantities. The total contract price at
award is the price for only the first year requirements. When funds become available for
quantities in the next fiscal year, the contracting officer will add those funds to the
contract at that time and add the price for that year's effort to the total contract price.
This procedure applies for each successive year until the last year of the Multiyear
procurement is fully funded. At any time after award, the contractor is obligated only to
perform what has been funded on the contract to date. The yearly funds available and
contact prices are listed in a special contract provision in section H (special provisions) of
the contract. [Ref. 28: p. 27]
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J. SUMMARY
This chapter provides the reader with the background and concepts of multiyear
procurement as well as explains those items which are unique to multiyear procurement.
This chapter gives the reader the background knowledge necessary to use chapter three
for the implementation of multiyear procurement.
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m. THE MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
Multiyear procurements, under certain circumstances, can provide a number of benefits
to the government. The primary benefit is savings in the cost of procurement of defense
systems. The best multiyear procurement candidates are those whose production costs are
known and whose future requirements and configuration are stable. Approval of a
multiyear procurement candidate by the Navy, OSD, and the Congress requires detailed
documentation of expected cost-savings; budget availability for multiyear procurements;
and at least some political support. It must be evident that initial cost savings estimates
are realistic and will actually be achieved in the final award of a multiyear contract. In
order to ensure this, initial contact with the contractor must be made by the Government,
and continuing close communications must be maintained. Contractor cost estimates must
be generated on both an annual and a multiyear basis, and should include vendor and
subcontractor inputs. Critical examinations of costs and sources of cost savings should be
made by the Government, and, although it is not a requirement, disagreements with the
contractor should be discussed and resolved, if possible. [Ref. 20: p. 14]
When at all possible, it will be desirable to obtain competitive multiyear procurement
proposals from more than one vendor. Experience with the multiyear competitive
procurement show that General Dynamics reduced its unit price for F-16 aircraft when
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threatened by competition from the Northrop F-20 for special mission purposes. [Ref. 20:
p. 14]
While Chapter II described the background and concepts of multiyear procurement,
Chapter III describes the process for submitting the multiyear procurement candidate for
approval. Detailed descriptions of relevant data are presented in the appendices.
B. GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING A MULTIYEAR CONTRACT
While this chapter deals in detail with the subject later on, the following is a good
summary description ofthe multiyear procurement process:
1
.
Conduct multiyear feasibility study, evaluate possible buy profiles, and develop savings
estimates using contractor inputs.
2. Document the study in a multiyear exhibit justification package and prepare initial
multiyear findings.
3. Submit the multiyear exhibit package as a budget input to obtain up-front funds for
Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) material buys.
4. Present the initial multiyear findings package to the appropriate authority for approval
to solicit dual multiyear/annual buy proposals.
5. Solicit and obtain multiyear/annual buy firm proposals.
6. Validate initial estimated costs and savings by analyzing differences between multiyear
and annual buy proposals and then comparing proposals to original estimates;
document them in a validation findings package.
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7. Submit documentation for appropriate reporting and approvals.
8. Award the multiyear contract. The contract may be unpriced in the form of an
expanded advance but or letter contract, or it may be a firm definitized contract. [Ref.
19]
C. FEASIBILITY STUDY
The first step is to conduct a feasibility study to determine if the program is suitable for
multiyear procurement. It takes place prior to the formal solicitation process. The
primary purpose of the feasibility study is to evaluate the program against the multiyear
criteria described in Chapter 2. The output of the study is the initial finding supported by
a justification package consisting of several multiyear procurement exhibits (see appendix
A). These exhibits should demonstrate the program satisfies all the requirements of the
multiyear criteria. Further detail regarding the justification package is given in section E
of this chapter. If multiyear procurement appears to result in cost savings, the program
manager recommends use of a multiyear contract in the (POM) Program Objective
Memorandum. [Ref. 18: 43-7]
D. ESTIMATING COST REDUCTIONS
Proposed cost reductions are critical to the approval of a multiyear procurement
contract. A prime contractor must estimate its costs of production under two alternative
proposals (these need only be rough order of magnitude estimates.) The first estimate is
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based on a series of annual contracts for the period in question. The second estimate is
based on a multiyear contract for the same period. The funding profile of a multiyear
contract is front-loaded: expenditures and total obligation authority (TOA) in the first year
or two are normally greater than they would be if annual contracting were used, reflecting
initial EOQ purchases and extended advanced buys for inflation avoidance. This is shown
in appendix A where the estimated TOA budget requirements of the DDG-51 are
presented on both an annual and a multiyear basis for FY 96 to FY 01 . The government
monitors the contractor's estimation process and plays an active role in the validation of
cost reductions. A should cost analysis can be used to assist in the analysis of the
contractor's savings submissions. For more information about should cost analysis see
FAR Part 15.810. The difference in cost between the multiyear and annual buy estimates
is the cost reduction associated with a multiyear procurement contract. This difference in
cost is used to decide whether a program should be submitted to higher levels as a
multiyear procurement contract candidate. Mr. T. Kirby of Vitro Corporation assisted in
the DDG-51 multiyear procurement documentation. During an interview with Mr. T.
Kirby he stated: "There is no official guidance on a specific savings percentage but
historically Congress expected a 1 percent savings from multiyear procurement."
While both parties want sufficient multiyear procurement cost reductions to
justify the use of multiyear procurement, the government must exercise caution because
they are responsible for ensuring the cost estimates are as accurate as possible. All of
these cost estimates occur early in the program; actual costs will not be known for years
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after the multiyear procurement contracting decision is made. Cost estimation remains an
imprecise activity that must be used with great care
1. Key Places to Look for Cost Reductions
In AFSC Pamphlet 800-55, the Air Force expects the major cost reductions from
multiyear procurement contracts to come from inflation avoidance, vendor procurement,
and manufacturing. These areas in fact yielded the largest expected cost reductions
reported in the cases studied. [Ref. 15: p. 58]
Table 2 shows the sources of savings for six multiyear contract candidates in 1991, as
estimated by DoD. [Ref. 25: p. 10]
Then-year dollars in millions
Total savings Percent Savings





Table 2. Sources of savings for six multiyear contract candidates in 1991
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a. Inflation Avoidance
Moving from a series of annual contracts to a multiyear contract allows the contractor
to change the timing of their supply purchases. Using EOQ purchases, the contractor
tends to procure larger lot sizes and they tend to do this earlier in the cycle than under a
series of annual contracts. As a result of inflation, these earlier procurements are at a
lower cost than would be under an annual contract. Caution should be exercised when
calculating these cost savings. Two factors tend to offset the reductions: 1) the cost of
borrowing the funds required to fund these procurements and 2) the opportunity costs
associated with the use of these funds. [Ref. 15: p. 44]
b. Vendor Procurement
Under multiyear contracts, contractors purchase supplies in larger lot sizes (EOQ) than
those justified under annual contracts. As a result, prime contractors can reduce the price
they pay for these same supplies. Sikorsky reported that vendor procurement costs
accounts for 75 to 90 percent of cost savings attributable to multiyear contracts. Sikorsky
also reported that vendor procurement costs (including prime contractor materials
overhead) constitutes about two-thirds of total airframe contract costs. [Ref. 21 :p. 2-3]
c. Manufacturing
Product engineering can yield reductions by improving the design of a system and the
means of producing it or finding more efficient parts and materials for manufacturing
components used in the system. Contractors expect only fabrication activities to yield this
kind of cost reduction. Fabrication activities involved batch operations that lend
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themselves to cost reductions from rescheduling in a way that assembly activities do not.
[Ref. 15: p. 48] Multiple years allow better scheduling and use of production capacity.
There is no need to produce items in a rigid sequence if this is not the best method to save
costs or take advantage of other efficiencies. [Ref. 16: p. 31]
Attention should be given to overhead costs when calculating cost reductions for the
multiyear contract. The savings caused by the multiyear contract arrangement can cause
overhead costs to either increase or decrease. For example, Rockwell expected multiyear
procurement contracting to increase its overhead costs for the B-1B. Because the B-1B
was their primary activity at the time, this would require them to spread overhead
expenses over a smaller base, forcing them to raise their overhead rate. On the other
hand, General Dynamics expected multiyear procurement contracting to increase
international confidence in the F-16 program, there by increasing international sales. This
would increase the business base enough for General Dynamics to reduce its overhead
rate. [Ref. 15: p. 51]
E. MULTIYEAR JUSTIFICATION PACKAGE
When a multiyear contract is initiated, a strategic decision is made and future sessions
of Congress are committed to appropriating funds in support of outyear requirements.
The requirement for the justification package was established in the Department of
Defense Appropriations Bill of 1982: The House of Representatives Appropriations
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Committee (HAC) will require substantial supporting documentation to justify multiyear
contracting for major systems, to support claims regarding:
a. benefits derived from the MYP
b. stability or requirements and funding profile; and
c. degree of cost confidence; and
d. degree of design stability. [Ref. 23]
Through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process,
Congress gives permission for a multiyear procurement strategy to be pursued and
requires a multiyear justification package to support its decision. The multiyear
justification package consists of several multiyear procurement exhibits and is the output
of the feasibility study. The multiyear justification package accompanies the President's
Budget so Congress can consider the planned multiyear procurement along with the
overall budget. [Ref. 18: 43-8]
The multiyear justification package consists of 5 exhibits. Exhibits MYP-1 through
MYP-5 should be submitted for all multiyear candidate systems for which any of the
following is true:
• The anticipated multiyear procurement contract is $500 million or greater;
• Requires a cancellation ceiling in excess of $1 00 million;
• There are economic order quantity (EOQ) advance procurements in excess of
$20 million in any one year;
• The will be an unfunded contingent liability in excess of $20 million in any one
40
year;
• The procurement quantities of a previously approved MYP have been adjusted.
[Ref. 23: p. 4-5]
Exhibit MYP-1, Multiyear Procurement Criteria, establishes that the weapon system
meets the multiyear procurement criteria delineated in FAR Part 17. 103- 1(a). Narrative
must be included fully explaining how your multiyear procurement will fulfill these criteria.
MYP-1 also includes narrative regarding the impact on the industrial base. Congress is
concerned about the impact of multiyear procurements on the defense industrial base. The
benefits originally promised for multiyear procurements included enhanced competition
and capital investment, stability of employment, and increased vendor competence and
efficiency. Quantitative data supporting these claims should be presented whenever
possible. [Ref. 20: p. 47] The section in MYP-1 titled Savings and Cost Avoidance,
identifies the amount and sources of multiyear savings and explains what makes the
savings possible. Year by year multiyear cost savings, in then year dollars, are presented
in this exhibit. Total savings, by source, are also presented, with an explanation ofwhy it
occurs. Savings due to inflation avoidance should be explained explicitly. This section
answers the decision maker's questions about the dependability of the estimate of savings.
MYP-2, Acquisition Strategy comparative Summary, provides a comparative summary
of the annual buy and the multiyear alternatives. A separate summary should be included
for each multiyear contract included in the budget line item. Total contract price,
cancellation ceiling, and multiyear procurement cost savings should be presented in then
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year dollars. Risk factors are also addressed in this exhibit including requirement, funding
stability, configuration stability, and cost confidence. Each risk factor should be
categorized as low, medium or high.
Exhibit MYP-3, Total Program Funding Plan, compares the total amount needed from
a given appropriation to execute the total program for both the annual buy alternative and
the multiyear alternative. It presents the (TOA) total obligation authority requirements and
estimated outlays, by year, for both annual and multiyear contracts, presented in then-year
dollars. This exhibit provides an estimate of the savings to be realized from using the
multiyear procurement approach and shows the advance funds required to execute the
contract if EOQ purchasing is planned. This exhibit identifies the end item quantities by
FY and the amount of funds required in advance for each FY (advance procurement
funds). For the annual buy proposal, these are the funds necessary to acquire long lead
items. For the multiyear proposal, these are the funds necessary to purchase EOQ items in
advance. The outlay portion of this exhibit informs Congress how much money will be
paid out by the US Treasury each FY. [Ref. 18: p. 43-8] Its purpose is to illustrate the
effects of the different levels of advance procurements in the two contracts on a year by
year basis. [Ref. 20: p. 47] The total TOA difference on this exhibit will agree with the
"Cost Avoidance over Annual" line on exhibit MYP-2.
Exhibit MYP-4, Contract Funding Plan, contains a comparison of the proposed annual
buy and multiyear contracts along with the outlay pattern for both alternatives. It is
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similar to exhibit MYP-3 except it represents the cost for a given contract, not the cost for
the total program by FY.
Exhibit MYP-5, Present Value Analysis, presents yearly outlays on a year by year
basis, in then year dollars; in constant, budget year dollars; and in present value. Present
value is the value today of future cash flows, determined through application of the official
inflation rates issued periodically by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
The projected multiyear savings must reflect the value of money associated with the
accelerated expenditure of funds inherent in the first few years of multiyear contracts. In
general, the effects of inflation cause money expended earlier to be worth more than the
sum of money expended later. The guidance for the preparation of the present value
analysis is contained in DoD Instruction 7041 .3. [Ref. 1 8: p. 43-8]
The exhibit formats are presented in the DoD Financial Management Regulation,
Volume 2B. A completed justification package for the DDG-51 program is located in
appendix A.
F. ECONOMIC ORDER QUANTITY MATERIAL BUYS
EOQ effort must be funded to termination liability in an advance procurement line item.
The preferred method in which an advance procurement line may be established is to
submit the multiyear procurement candidate with the President's Budget in January of
each year. For this to occur, the multiyear justification package should be developed and
submitted with the service POM request in May of the preceding year. The full exhibit
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package should be submitted in time to support the Budget Estimate Submission (BES).
[Ref. 18: 43-9(6)] The timing sequence mirrors the timing for the whole multiyear
contract and is demonstrated in Appendix B.
G. VALIDATION PROCESS
The contracting process begins with the review of the initial findings. Once the initial
findings are approved the request for proposals or invitation for bids are issued. Offerors
are required to submit two proposals: an annual buy proposal and a multiyear proposal.
An analysis of the cost difference between the two proposals is performed by the program
office to determine if the proposed cost savings from the multiyear procurement are
similar to those of the initial finding. This is called the validation finding. If the savings
are in line with the initial finding, contracting will continue negotiations of the multiyear
contract. If multiyear savings determined in the validation finding do not justify pursuit of
that procurement strategy, the annual buy contract may be negotiated. During
Congressional committee hearings this guideline was established: "...no multiyear contract
shall be awarded if the savings are less than in the budget justification material submitted
to Congress." [Ref. 22: p.58] 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2306(h)(1) requires the
validation process to include an estimate of the multiyear savings based on contract data
rather than budgetary estimates before the multiyear contract can be awarded. Contract
data includes proposals for both multiyear and annual buy alternatives, price negotiation
memorandums, and the negotiated multiyear contract. [Ref. 14: 2306(hXl)]
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H. SAMPLE SCHEDULE AND LEVELS OF REVIEW/APPROVAL
SUGGESTED
EVENT COMPLETION
1. Program Manager's Initial Assessment Jim FY 1
2. Contractor's Initial Assessment (for sole source selection) Jul
3. Government's Initial Assessment (for competitive situation) Jul
4. Planning the Task of Obtaining the Supporting Rationale
for MYP Aug
5. Completion of a Study ofMYP Dec FY2
6. Analysis of the Study by the Intermediate Level Staff Jan
7. Identification of Candidacy in the PPBS (POM) Jan
8. Analysis by Head of Contracting Activity Feb
9. Analysis by Service Headquarters May
1 0. Analysis by Service Secretary Jun
1 1
.
Analysis by Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition
& Technology), Director of Defense Procurement
(USD(A&T)DP) and the Under Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) (Program/Budget) (USD(C)(P/B)) Aug
1 2
.
Identification ofMYP in FYDP* Aug
13. Release ofRFPs Sep
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14. Receipt of Proposals Dec FY3
1 5
.
Quick Evaluation ofMYP (Validation) Jan
1 6. Briefing to Head of Contracting Activity Apr
17. Negotiations Apr
18. Contract Award Jun
Identifying MYP as the method of procurement in the DoD approved FYDP would
constitute approval for MYP unless the multiyear contract (1) required a cancellation
ceiling ofmore than $100 million, (2) provided for economic order quantity purchases in
excess of $20 million, or (3) included an unfunded contingent liability in excess of $20
million. Congressional notification is required for any ofthe three listed reasons. [Ref. 27:
p. 67]
A chart displaying the multiyear timing process for the Defense Satellite
Communication System Program, DSCS III is shown in appendix B. The Navy Multiyear
Procurement Contract Certification Process is displayed in appendix C.
I. SUMMARY
This chapter is developed to sufficiently educate program managers for them to
implement a multiyear procurement. Program managers must objectively evaluate their
programs against the proper criteria, properly develop multiyear procurement savings
estimations, and search for opportunities to use multiyear procurement contracts. It is
also important to note that multiyear procurement is not exclusively for large weapon
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systems. The benefits of multiyear procurement can be realized on contracts that include
EOQ advance procurement of $20 million or less in any one year or includes an unfunded
cancellation ceiling of $20 million or less. These smaller programs can use multiyear
procurement with much less oversight which allows the decision to use or not to use




IV. ISSUES IN MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
There is a call for the increased use of multiyear procurement within the Department of
Defense. Though not a panacea for all acquisition ills, multiyear procurement is a key
component in any serious effort to improve the acquisition process. It offers excellent
opportunities for effecting significant savings and strengthening the defense industrial
base. [Ref. 10:p.23]
Long term business relationships are prevalent in the commercial sector and multiyear
procurement is the government's answer to these long term relationships. While
Government contracting is already burdensome with rules and regulations, multiyear
procurement has additional unique requirements. These requirements generate unique
issues for contracting personnel who use multiyear procurement. This chapter deals with
some of those issues.
B. METHODOLOGY
The information in this chapter focuses on some of the issues users of multiyear
procurement consider relevant. Questionnaires were sent to current and past users of
multiyear procurement, both in Government and industry. The respondents were selected
on the basis of there current and in depth experience of the multiyear procurement
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process. This was determined by holding brief phone interviews with a representative
from each office, during which I wa isured that all recipients would be experienced.
The responses received from the van. ^s commands were a combined effort of several
experienced individuals within that office. The recipients of the questionnaires represent
contracting, program management and finance. The following table displays the
breakdown of responses based on the occupational background of the individuals who
completed them.
RESPONDENT BACKGROUND Number % of Total
Air Force Program Management 4 20%
Navy Program Management 3 15%
Army Program Management 2 10%
Air Force Contracts 2 10%
Navy Contracts 3 15%
OSD Comptroller 1 05%
OSD Contract Policy 2 10%
Commercial Contractor 3 15%
Total 20 100%
Table 3. Breakdown of Questionnaire Respondents by Background
The data gathered is qualitative in nature based on responses generated from 3
questions.
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The questionnaire was preceded by phone conversations with each prospective
recipient to ensure that they would be encouraged to provide a response. Appendix E
provides a copy of the survey questionnaire. E-mail was used for the dissemination and
replies of the questionnaires.
C. LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The study was limited to multiyear contracts for major weapon systems. Copies of
eight questionnaires were sent to government offices and one copy was sent to a
contractor facility. Seventeen responses were received from the Government and three
responses were received from the contractor facility. Consequently, the results of the
study primarily reflect the government's concerns.
The seventeen Government respondents do not represent all the multiyear programs
currently existing. Due to the time constraint the researcher only selected the larger
programs from each service to get different service perspectives. In order to get even a
wider perspective respondents were selected in the areas of budget and contract policy at
the OSD level.
As a result ofphone interviews made with the perspective respondents prior to sending
the questionnaire the following assumptions were made; (1) the respondents who received
the questionnaires were qualified to provide the information for their organizations, (2)
respondents provided unbiased and impartial answers as a result of keeping their identities
confidential, and (3) the readers of this study are familiar with Government procurement
practices and procedures.
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D. ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
There weTe six issues identified by the respondents. The issues were drawn from all
three questions in the questionnaire. The total responses associated with the following
issues will not total to twenty since some respondents listed more than one issue.
1. Issue: The requirement that a multiyear procurement not exceed five years.
Response: Six of the respondents believe the five years allowed for multiyear
procurement is insufficient. The long production times involved with complex weapon
systems sometimes exceed five years. One of the respondent commands working on the
C-17 program recently had to have special language written into the multiyear legislation
allowing them to put a seven year program in place.
Commentary: The multiyear time frame of more than one year and not to exceed
five years originated over thirty years ago. Since that time the weapon systems being
purchased by the Department of Defense have realized a tremendous growth in
complexity. As a result, the five year maximum for multiyear procurement has become
inadequate for some programs.
While longer multiyear contracts provide greater budget stability to the contractor and
program office, it also causes Congress to relinquish more power over the budget. Due to
the cancellation ceilings involved with multiyear contracts, Congress is extremely reluctant
to cancel these programs. Congress is concerned about the loss of programming
flexibility. The Department of Defense position is that if a program meets stability of
funding and requirements criteria, then loss of flexibility is acceptable. When a program
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extends for seven years and the budget is dramatically cut in those later years, Congress
has less flexibility in its decision of where to cut to meet the reduced budget. Congress
has misgivings about both the weakened congressional oversight of military spending that
results from multiyear procurement and the practice of committing future Congresses and
administrations to current spending programs. [Ref. 10: p. 23] The researcher does not
believe that Congress will increase the regulatory time frame from five to seven years, but
will continue to look at each contract individually as they did with the C-l 7 program.
2. Issue: The policy of level unit pricing.
Response: Five of the respondents believe the requirement for level unit pricing
should be removed. An exception to the requirement for level unit prices was desired for
the C-l 7 program. The following is a statement made by one member of that program:
"Had we been buying some commercial item that was mass produced, this (level unit
pricing) would not have been a problem. But since we were buying a military aircraft
which has varying cost based on the production rate, and our rate was going to be varying
over the next seven years, this was not logical." Varying costs are based on production
rates, and long multiyear programs for large weapon systems, such as aircraft and ships,
have varying production rates. On these expensive items a small variance in the
production rate will translate into very large dollar differences in the estimated level unit
price and the actual per unit costs.
Commentary: The researcher believes that while unit pricing is not perfect it is
necessary. Unit pricing under a multiyear contract differs from an annual year contract. It
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is true that per unit costs become more difficult to calculate as the variables affecting price
and cost have greater interaction over time, but unit pricing is the one element used to
form comparisons between annual and multiyear cost proposals. Without an effort to
diminish the impact of time on this element, the resulting figures would be meaningless. In
order to arrest this erosion, level unit pricing is used to affect prices. [Ref. 1 6: p. 1 8]
The only exceptions to level unit pricing are; (1) the application of an economic price
adjustment provision, or (2) when level unit pricing is not in the Government's interest,
the head of a contracting activity or a designee may approve the use of variable unit
pricing.
3. Issue: The increased initial funding required for the EOQ and advanced buy
requirements of multiyear procurement.
Response: Twelve respondents expressed concern over the increased initial funding
required for multiyear contracts. The respondents feel the funding needed to finance the
EOQ in the first year of multiyear procurements use money needed for other important
weapon programs. If a program passes all the hurdles and is approved for multiyear
procurement, the risk for cancellation is remote. They also feel annual legislation
requiring the full funding of cancellation ceilings should be discontinued and the
subsequently unfenced Total Obligation Authority (TOA) used to fund other programs
and thereby lower the overall DOD TOA requirement. On the other hand, a comptroller
working for OSD stated:
Ifwe are reasonably sure there will be an ongoing requirement for a given system,
we should commit to multiyear procurement. For better or worse, in recent years
those have been few and far between. Secondly, once a decision is made to pursue
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MYP, the Service should budget the appropriate level of investment upfront,
particularly for EOQ material, to ensure that maximum savings are attained. [Ref.
34]
Commentary: Congress directs the EOQ advance procurement be funded to
the limit of the government's liability. This precludes requiring any future appropriation
to satisfy the government's liability should a multiyear contract be canceled. Given the
recent instability and uncertainty with the DoD budget, the services have been reluctant to
commit to a given procurement profile. Ofthe services, the Army appears to be the
most reluctant to provide initial EOQ funding. Not only did a comptroller from OSD
emphasize the Army as being especially reluctant but a former Army program manager
cited a recent incident where a program lost significant potential savings due to the
refusal of the Army to fund the full EOQ requirement.
The researcher speculates that Congress would be reluctant to make this change. If
the change to the regulations was allowed and a service decided to cancel a multiyear
contract which was not fully funded, Congress would be forced to find the funds for
the cancellation charge from other programs. This is the reason the regulations regarding
fully funded cancellation ceilings were enacted in the first place.
4. Issue: Discount savings of multiyear procurements over annual procurements.
Response: Three respondents expressed a concern over the large cost savings of
multiyear procurements over annual procurements expected by Congress. Congress has
traditionally seen large discounts for multiyear procurements over single year
procurements. That is to say the discount to the PROPOSED price has been in that range.
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The C-17 contractor offered a 5% discount to contract on a multiyear basis but it was to
an ALREADY NEGOTIATED price. To make the discount appear presentable for
Congress required considerable extra work. The government documented and presented
the price advantages to the savings obtained against prices of the out year options in a
negotiated production contract for aircraft of a previous lot.
Commentary: The researcher believes that a cost benefit should be realized from the
use of multiyear contract over an annual contract. Due to the length of the contracts and
the requirement of a cancellation ceiling the government takes on considerable more risk
using multiyear procurement. As to the "large" percentage savings required by Congress,
current multiyear programs seem to show otherwise. Referring to Table 1 in Chapter 2,
six of the eleven current and proposed multiyear programs provide less than ten percent
cost savings. During an interview with an individual involved with the DDG-51 program
he stated, "While we only calculate a 6.4% cost savings, the program provides a
tremendous benefit to the industrial base." The researcher speculates that Congress
considers other factors, such as the impact to the industrial base, when they decide
whether or not to support a multiyear program. Also, the more stability (less risk) the
program has the less cost savings required to offset the risk.
5. Issue: Large number of configuration changes makes it difficult to achieve the
projected cost savings over time.
Response: One respondent stated that it is difficult to achieve projected cost savings
when there are a large number of configure changes.
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Commentary: The researcher believes this contract should not even be a multiyear
contract. Multiyear procurement is designed for mature, stable programs. One study
conducted in 1994 found that 79% of industry respondents and 93% of Government
respondents felt that the multiyear procurement programs they were working on were
stable with only some ECPs. [Ref. 10: p. 83] If there are a large number of configuration
changes directly impacting the program, more work should go into the process of
selecting a proper multiyear candidate. While a stable design will generate some ECPs, a
large number ofECPs is a definite indicator ofprogram instability.
6. Issue: Inadequate timing of multiyear procurements.
Response: Fourteen respondents had an issue with starting multiyear procurements
during the wrong time of the budget cycle. They stated that the multiyear procurement
process should be started in sufficient time to support the POM for the year in which the
contract is to be initiated.
Commentary: The researcher agrees with the respondents on the issue of multiyear
procurement timing. The multiyear procurement process needs to allow enough time to
do a credible feasibility study, come up with good cost estimates and to give the budget
panels at the command, service and OSD levels plenty of time to review the submission.
Multiyear procurements that are proposed late quite often will not allow the program
office sufficient time to do the research and analysis needed to see where the potential
savings are, and whether the multiyear procurement is really worth pursuing. Also,
inadequate attention will be given to the administrative details. Thinking through and
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properly integrating the CLIN structure, funding clause, cancellation clause (and
cancellation ceiling amounts), etc. takes time.
E. CONCLUSION
Multiyear procurement is a viable method for weapon systems acquisition. While there
are aspects of multiyear procurement that some program offices would, at times, like to
change, multiyear procurement is workable as is.
It is difficult to develop a system that meets the disparate needs of the contractor,
program office and Congress. The end result has been the development of a system based
on compromise and accommodation. Multiyear procurement is designed to satisfy
conflicting needs and in doing so cannot be everything to everybody. While multiyear
procurement represents budget stability to the contractor and program office, it represents
budget inflexibility to Congress. While the services enjoy the economic savings provided
by multiyear procurement they do not like the large up front funding required.
When the program office considers multiyear procurement candidates, they must
achieve a reasonable balance of benefits and risks. The criteria require that (1) the
estimated contract costs and projected savings be realistic, (2) the minimum requirement
(total quantity, production rate, and procurement rate) for the system be expected to
remain substantially unchanged, (3) there is a reasonable expectation that sufficient
funding will be requested by DOD to carry out the contract, and (4) the design be stable.
Failing to meet one or more of the criteria may not necessarily mean that a system is an
inappropriate candidate, but indicates areas of increased risk that must be weighed against
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the potential savings to determine whether multiyear procurement approval be granted.
[Ref. 25: p. 2]
Consequently, approval authorities are ambivalent about multiyear procurements -
wanting to obtain their advantages on the one hand; anxious to avoid their risks and
shortcomings on the other hand. As a result, a set of requirements for the successful
submission of multiyear procurements requests has been developed. Some of these are
legislated requirements, while others have to do with proper program management. In
each case, the program office plays the key role in seeing that these requirements are met,
and that the projected benefits of a multiyear procurement candidate are actually achieved.
[Ref. 20: p. 49] The handbook contained in Chapters two and three was developed to
assist the program office in this endeavor.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
Multiyear procurement has become heavily associated with the acquisition of large
weapon systems. More consideration should be given to the use of multiyear procurement
for smaller acquisitions. Multiyear procurement need not be for the maximum of five
years, but could be for as little as two or three years. The FY 84 Appropriations Act
authorized entry into small multiyear contracts without prior congressional approval. In
today's bureaucratic and cumbersome acquisition environment, this decentralizes and
streamlines, to some degree, multiyear procurement approval. However, be aware that
the additional up front funding for EOQ advanced procurement is still subject to the
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approvals and procedures of the normal budget process. If the initial savings estimate is
substantiated by contractor proposals and eventually negotiated prices, the approval
process for small multiyear contracts is essentially like any other annual contract. [Ref.
33: p. 19]
A respondent to the questionnaire recommended that each service establish a staff focal
point for multiyear procurement. This focal point should understand the law, regulations,
policies and how multiyear contracts in general work. This individual can be an advocate
for multiyear procurement and help advertise the potential benefits. This individual can be
a staff consultant for each program manager undertaking a multiyear procurement. This
kind of facilitator keeps each program management office from having to start from
scratch and can make multiyear procurement less intimidating to newcomers.
The focal point can also place more policy emphasis, accompanied by how-to guidance
on using multiyear procurement for small and medium procurements. Congressional
approval would not be required where the multiyear criteria fit lower dollar value
procurements. There is undoubtedly untapped potential to generate multiyear
procurement savings in this less than major systems arena.
The services should collaborate on developing a central multiyear procurement
guidance manual. There would be merit in the services evaluating each others' guidance
material and consolidating what is common in a joint or OSD publication (or via the
Defense Acquisition Deskbook). This will develop a uniform process available to
everyone in DOD.
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G. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
There are a few other areas of research which will help us gain a better understanding
of multiyear procurement. These areas are:
1. Using ofMultiyear Procurement in Less Than Major Weapon System Acquisition
There are countless opportunities to take advantage of the benefits of multiyear
procurement with smaller procurements. There appears to be a reluctance to use
multiyear contracting with these smaller procurements. The discovery and examination of
these reasons would help expand the use of multiyear procurement into what appears to be
a large market for its use.
2. Development of a Joint Service Multiyear Guide
There is much overlapping work being done on multiyear procurement by the different
services. Research should be done to discover who is developing what within the
Department of Defense. A survey could also be disseminated to discover the support
which exists DOD wide for the development of a joint guide.
3. The Influence of Politics on Multiyear Procurement
A study focusing solely on the past and present influence of politics on multiyear
procurement. It would be extremely interesting to discover to what extent politics have
shaped our final multiyear contracts. Also, how this political influence may have benefited
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APPENDIX B. MULTIYEAR TIMING PROCESS
Defense Satellite Communications System Program, DSCS III,
MYP Candidate Approval Plan




































































POM - Program Objective Memorandum
ROM - Rough Order of Magnitude
BES - Budget Estimate Submission
AP - Acquisition Plan
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Advance Procurement - An exception to the full funding policy which allows procurement of
long lead time items (advanced long lead procurement) or economic order quantities of items
(advance EOQ procurement) in a fiscal year in advance of that in which the related end item is to
be acquired. Advance procurements may include materials, parts and components as well as
costs associated with the further processing of those materials, parts and components.
Annual Funding - The current Congressional practice of limiting authorizations and
appropriations to one fiscal year at a time. The term should not be confused with two year or
three year funds which permit the Executive Branch more than one year to obligate the funds.
Cancellation - A term unique to multiyear contracts. The unilateral right of the Government not
to continue contract performance for subsequent fiscal years' requirements. Cancellation is
effective only upon the failure of the government to fund successive fiscal year requirements
under the contract. It is not the same as termination.
Cancellation Ceiling - The cancellation ceiling is the maximum amount that the Government
will pay the contractor which the contractor would have recovered as a part of the unit price, had
the contract been completed. The amount which is actually paid to the contractor upon
settlement for unrecovered costs (which can only be equal to or less than the ceiling) is referred
to as the cancellation charge. This ceiling generally includes only nonrecurring costs.
Expenditure Funding - Governments funds the Contractor's expenditures plus termination
liability. Synonymous with funding to termination liability.
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Full Funding - Funds are available at the time of award to cover the total estimated cost to
deliver a given quantity of complete, militarily useable end items or services. Under current
policy (DoD Directive 7200.4), the entire funding needs of the fiscal year production quantity
must be provided unless an exception for advance procurement has been approved. A test of full
funding is to ask the question, Does any part of this year's buy depend on a future year
appropriation to result in the delivery of complete units? If the answer is yes, the contract is
probably not fully funded. The principle of full funding applies to the Procurement Title of the
annual appropriation act and therefore affects production contracts but not RDT&E contracts.
Incremental Funding - Funds are not available at the time of contract award to complete a
fiscal year's quantity of end items in a finished, military useable form. Future year appropriations
are required in order to complete the items or tasks.
Multivear Acquisition - means contracting, to some degree, for more than the current year
requirement. Examples include multiyear contracts and advance EOQ acquisition. Generally,
advance long lead acquisitions in support of a single year's requirement would not be considered
multiyear acquisition.
Multivear Funding - A Congressional authorization and appropriation covering more than one
fiscal year. The term should not be confused with two year or three year funds which cover only
one fiscal year's requirement but permit the Executive Branch more than one year to obligate the
funds.
Nonrecurring Costs - Those production costs which are generally incurred on a one time basis
which include such costs as plant or equipment relocation; plant rearrangement; special tooling
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and special test equipment; preproduction engineering; initial spoilage and rework; and
specialized work force training.
Recurring Costs - Production cost that vary with the quantity being produced such as labor and
materials.
Termination for Convenience - Procedure which can apply to any Government contract,
including multiyear contracts. As contrasted with cancellation, termination can be effected at any
time during the life of the contract (cancellation is commonly effected between fiscal years) and
can be for the total quantity or a partial quantity (whereas cancellation must be for all subsequent
fiscal years' quantities).
Termination Liability - the maximum cost the Government would incur if a contract is
terminated. In the case of a multiyear contract terminated before completion of the current fiscal
year's deliveries, termination liability would include an amount for both current year termination
charges and outyear cancellation charges.
Termination Liability Funding - Obligating sufficient contract funds to cover the contractor's
expenditures plus termination liability but not the total cost of the completed end items.
Unfunded Cancellation Ceiling - The total amount of DoD's liability for which funds have not
been budgeted or appropriated in the case of multiyear contract cancellation.
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APPENDIX E. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is being sent to you per our earlier conversation.
The purpose of this questionnaire is to gather insight from individuals who have previous
experience in multiyear procurement. Your responses will be analyzed and developed into an
appendix for a multiyear procurement deskguide. The knowledge and experience provided in
your answers will greatly assist other DoD acquisition personnel in their development of
multiyear procurements.
This questionnaire consists of the three questions included in this e-mail. Please answer these
questions to the best of you ability on this same e-mail and reply as soon as you can.
1. What were the one or two issues which were the most problematic for your multiyear
procurement and what program were you working on?
2. What actions did you take to deal with the issues described in question one?
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